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 The contract for the consultancy was dated February 10, 2004 and 
required a draft report by April 30th and a final report by May 20th.  The 
consultancy involved reading COFI publications, visiting Ottawa to talk with IDRC 
employees, interviewing project participants in Quebec, discussing the project 
with professionals interested in regulation and supervision of financial 
cooperatives, and contacting those involved in the project overseas. 
 
 The contract laid out three objectives for the consultancy: 
 
1. To assess the work undertaken by COFI, including the institutional 
setup of the project. 
2. To offer reflections on the project’s thematic approach and strategies in 
relation to other work in microfinance. 
3. To identify research gaps in microfinance that might be filled by future 





 In early 2000 Laval University and 5 other cooperating institutions 
submitted a project proposal to IDRC on microfinance.  It was approved and 
scheduled to begin in May but the start of the project was later postponed until 
November 1, 2000.  The project ran for three years and officially ended on 
October 31, 2003.  In addition to the approximately $640 thousand provided by 
IDRC, the Developpement International Dejardins (DID) reinforced the effort with 
another $130 thousand.  Research was to be done in five countries: Benin, 
Canada, Colombia, Morocco, and the Philippines. 
 
 Three general questions were background for the project: Is microfinance 
useful in easing poverty?  Can financial cooperatives play a significant role in 
poverty alleviation?  What regulation and supervision (r&s) regime would best 
assist financial cooperatives to be more efficient, stable, and durable?   The 
project title and the initial proposal stressed regulation and supervision.  
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The emphasis on poverty in the project proposal was consistent with 
MIMAP’s program framework.1  Those who prepared the project proposal posited 
that properly regulated and supervised financial cooperatives would provide more 
financial services to small- and medium-sized enterprises.  This, in turn, would 
allow these firms to employ more poor people, thus connecting to MIMAP’s 
overall objective of poverty alleviation.  
 
The reach of the project was ambitious.  The project team attempted to 
link so-called market approaches, financial markets, regulation and supervision, 
and financial cooperatives, small and medium sized enterprises, with poverty 
alleviation.  This included modeling the operations of COFIs, modeling decisions 
made by firm/households, and measuring the ultimate impact of access to 
finance on poverty.  In addition, the project team planned to prepare a research 
manual and sponsor several meetings on topics related to the project. 
 
The objectives laid out in the project proposal were likewise ambitious:2
1. To articulate the theoretical foundations and execute the 
corresponding empirical tests regarding the concept of poverty 
alleviation through financing small and medium sized 
enterprises.  
2. To articulate the theoretical foundations and execute the 
corresponding empirical tests on adequate regulation and 
supervision regimes for financial cooperatives. 
3. To encourage a debate among regulators, donor agencies, and 
leaders of financial cooperatives. 
4. To generate specific proposals and documentation of regulation 
and supervision regimes that might be used as references by 
policy makers 
5. To document regimes of delegated monitoring that might be use 
by regulators of financial cooperatives. 
6. To articulate the theoretical foundations and execute the 
corresponding empirical tests regarding adequate capital 
standards for financial cooperatives. 
7. To encourage a debate among regulators, donor agencies, and 
leaders of financial cooperatives about capital standards. 
8. To propose capital standards that might be used as a reference 
point by regulators of financial cooperatives. 
9. To articulate the theoretical foundations and do the 
corresponding empirical tests regarding contract design and 
compensation packages for managers of financial cooperatives. 
10. To propose improved contracts and compensation packages for 
managers of financial cooperatives. 
                                      
1  The version of the project proposal that I reviewed did not have page numbers.  In addition the 
page numbers listed in the Table of Contents do not correspond to a manual count of the text 
pages.  It is, therefore, awkward, to cite specific page numbers in this report. 




Fit of The Project in The Microfinance Industry 
 
 Three elements of the project overlap with other microfinance efforts.  The 
first is the focus on an important component of the industry, financial 
cooperatives.  This emphasis is doubly justified:  these cooperatives provide 
valuable financial services to tens of millions of people of modest means, but 
these organizations have not received their fair share of attention and support 
from donors who promote microfinance.3
 
 The second common element is the concern with regulation and 
supervision.  COFI’s efforts focused on documenting the agency flaws in financial 
cooperatives that, in turn, partly justify r&s.  This is a narrower focus than other 
recent work done on strengthening r&s in the microfinance industry.   This 
broader work has wrestled with the problems of who should be regulated, what to 
regulate, information needed for r&s, and the institutional framework that should 
carry out this task (for examples see Arbuckle, Christen and others, Vogel, and 
Westley).4
 
 The third overlap is doing credit-impact studies.  Over the last few years 
an increasing portion of foreign aid has been justified by stressing poverty 
alleviation, including MIMAP/IDRC’s efforts.   This, in turn, leads policy makers to 
request information on how the foreign aid impacted poverty, especially in the 
microfinance industry where hundreds of researchers have done credit impact 





                                      
3 Donors and governments have shied away from helping financial cooperatives because of bad 
experiences during the three decades prior to 1990.  Explanations for these problems include 
subsidized interest rate policies, external funding that corroded cooperative performance, and 
macroeconomic turmoil that damaged all financial institutions, including financial cooperatives.  
The macroeconomic environment began to improve in many countries in the early 1990s and this 
allowed a more hospitable environment for financial cooperatives.  At about the same time, 
donors mostly ceased providing external funding for lending by cooperatives.  In addition, most 
donors and many financial cooperatives adopted interest rate policies in the 1980s that were 
more market determined.  Together these important changes allowed a resurgence of financial 
cooperatives in many low-income countries, something donor employees have been slow to 
recognize.  Some donor employees are also leery of the religious roots of many financial 
cooperatives.  They are discomforted by advocates who extolling the merits of their cooperative 
model in quasi-theological terms.  
4 My impression is that the leaders of COFI assumed the best r&s model was one where a strong 
centralized federation did the regulation and supervision of dependent financial cooperatives.   
Others who work on r&s problems might disagree with that conclusion and argue that conflicts of 
interest in federations are a serious concern.  
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 The most important contribution of the project was to elevate awareness 
about the important topic of regulation and supervision of financial cooperatives.  
Several meetings sponsored by COFI and a number of presentations by 
participants in professional meetings were important parts of this.  The 
substantial number of requests that Dr. Fischer receives for consulting 
assignments on r&s problems, and the fact that Martin Desrochers was hired by 
DID because of his experience with r&s and the COFI project, illustrates the 
interest in regulation and supervision of financial cooperatives.  Mexico is an 
example of where project participants have influenced the discussion about r&s.  
 
 Within r&s, COFI elevated the understanding and importance of agency 
costs in financial cooperatives. This includes developing methods to measure 
these costs, suggesting policy changes to ameliorate these problems, and 
proposing the interesting hypothesis that agency problems are a primary factor in 
the malfunctioning of financial cooperatives.  Project work could result in highly 
useful measures of agency costs that might be used both by regulators and 
managers of financial cooperatives. 
  
Three other products of the project are noteworthy.  A half dozen or so 
students used information collected by the project for their theses or 
dissertations.  Possibly, some of the students will go on to do additional 
professional work on r&s problems.  Their publications supplement the 
considerable amount of additional research papers stimulated by the project.  
Additional publications include a special issue on microfinance of the Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies due out in late 2004, a manual of research 
procedures, numerous working papers, and several drafts of proposed journal 
articles.5  The contribution of these drafts awaits the judgment of peer review. 
 
Several potentially useful data bases are the third important product of the 
project.  One data base includes 1,238 household interviews with borrowers and 
non-borrowers from Benin, Colombia, and the Philippines.  Another data base 
contains information on financial cooperatives from Benin, Colombia, the 
Philippines, Bolivia, and Peru.  Relatively little of this information was thoroughly 
analyzed by the time the project formally concluded.  I assume that students and 
researchers will do further useful analysis of this information in the future. 
 
Overall, the project laid the foundation for future work on the important 





                                      
5 A listing of the approximately three-dozen publications associated with the project is presented 
in Table 6.1 of the “Final Technical Reports,” dated November 15, 2003.  Nine of these articles 




 The project experienced some problems and included several elements 




The reach of the project was overly ambitious, especially considering the 
relatively small amount of money that IDRC allocated for the research.  It was 
unrealistic to expect that all of the items in the project proposal could be modeled 
and fleshed out with empirical information for multiple countries, along with 
developing a network of researchers who would perpetuate the effort, for only 
about three-quarters of a million dollars.6
 
Development organizations need a grand design to sell their programs 
and to sustain funding.  From a microfinance perspective, however, MIMAP’s 
design is too grand.  Trying to fit small microfinance research projects into this 
grand design could either result in bait-and-switch, or a project that is yards wide 
and inches deep.   
 
While it is certainly justified to focus on projects that assist people who are 
relatively poor, microfinance is a weak tool for addressing poverty.  From the 
borrowers’ perspective, a loan is debt that must be repaid.7  Borrowers only 
benefit from debt to the extent they can generate more income from a debt-
induced investment than is needed to repay the principal, plus interest, plus the 
amount of transaction cost they incur in obtaining the loan.  Some of these 
investments may turn sour and leave the borrower worse off than they were 
before borrowing.  Additional debt may allow some individuals to capitalize on 
economic opportunities, but debt cannot create opportunities.  It will not heal the 
sick, it will not provide land to the landless, it will not create a market for ones’ 
products or services, it will not make the illiterate able to read, it will not provide 
law and order, it cannot form a favorable crop-growing environment, it cannot 
create entrepreneurship, and it will not change cultural norms that severely limit 
the activities of women. 
                                      
6 By way of contrast, in 2000 the Inter-American Development Bank signed a contract with the 
Canadian Co-operative Association to assist with credit union development in the Bahamas.  
Strengthening the regulation and supervision of a small number of credit unions was an objective 
of the project.  The contract was for three years, for one small country, and involved about as 
much money as the COFI project. 
7 Over the past few decades there has been a metamorphous in views toward loans.  
Traditionally, religious leaders and philosophers cautioned people not to go into debt. Gradually, 
this negative notion of “debt” has been replaced by the positive notion “credit.”  People generally 
ignore that credit and debt are opposite sides of the same coin.  Advocates of microcredit 
programs have occasionally argued that credit is a universal entitlement and some have 
suggested it is an all-purpose anti-biotic for treating poverty.   Providing loans to poor people is 




Of the two major activities in finance, lending and deposit taking, deposits 
have the closest relationship to poverty resolution.  Historically, most people 
pulled themselves out of poverty through saving, not through borrowing; people 
for thousands of years improved their lot through savings without the assistance 
of loans from financial cooperatives or other non-governmental organizations.  
Unfortunately, COFI paid little attention to the deposit taking side of financial 





A particularly serious problem in the project was the failure of the Centre 
de Gestion des Cooperatives, HEC, in Montreal to fulfill its obligations on the 
topic of r&s.  This resulted in too little work being done on the general topic of 
r&s, the primary objective of the project.  The work on r&s that was done focused 
on modeling financial cooperatives, empirical work on agency problems, and 
presenting arguments about the superiority of the highly integrated and 
centralized r&s typified by the Desjardans system.  Readers of project 
publications come away with little understanding of the unique r&s problems and 
arrangements that exist in the three countries where empirical work was done 
(for example, see Arbuckle). 
 
Developing Research Networks 
 
 A number of countries have social science research institutions that do 
policy research.  The Philippines Institute for Development Studies and the 
Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies are examples of these 
organizations.  Typically, they employ a small number of permanent staff and hire 
students or temporary employees to do interviewing, or help with short-term 
studies.  Seldom are these organizations large enough for the professional staff 
to specialize in topics such as financial cooperatives and their regulation and 
supervision.   
 
 Given these conditions, one should not expect that a small, short-term 
project such as COFI would create a sustained network of researchers on the 
topic of r&s.  Researchers’ interest in the topic will likely last only as long as 
external funds are available.  People with the credentials and skills to do this type 
of research are often pulled into other government jobs, find employment in the 
private sector, or move on to work with donors. The facts that one of the three 
principal country investigators in the project had moved on to another institution 
                                      
8 The surfeit of rural deposits mobilized by financial cooperatives in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan 
over the past 100 strongly suggests a larger number of poor people benefit from attractive deposit 
facilities than the number who benefit from borrowing from these organizations.  The successful 
reform of the government-owned Bank Rakyat Indonesia since the early 1980s leads to a similar 
conclusion:  more people in rural areas benefit from depositing than benefit from borrowing.   
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by the time the project terminated, and one of the Laval administrators took 
another job with Desjardins, illustrates this point. 
 
 Perhaps the most that IDRC can claim in regard to building a network is 
that the project alerted a number of people to the issue of r&s and reinforced this 
with a number of related publications.  In other words, the project for a time, 
enhanced networking on the topics of r&s and impact studies, but had a lesser 
effect on developing a persistent network.  The most lasting effect of good 




Originally, the project proposed to do research in five countries: Morocco, 
Benin, Canada, Colombia, and the Philippines.  Eventually, no fieldwork was 
done in Morocco or Canada.  In addition, plans to incorporate results from 
parallel research in Mexico funded by others failed to materialize. 
  
The fact that research was eventually done in only three countries 
indicates that the project’s initial objectives were too ambitious, and/or that the 
project was substantially under funded. A follow-on project ought to have less 




A disagreement between IDRC and Laval University over the percent of 
the project funding that was to be paid to the University for overhead stalled the 
start of the project for six months.  Eventually a compromise was reached that 
transferred funds from research efforts to pay more overhead to the University.  
This delay later caused an extension of the project and contributed to too little 
data being analyzed by the time the project ended in October 2003. 
 
The approximately 15 percent that IDRC allows for overhead is 
inordinately low by U.S. standards, at least, where overheads on similar 
university research contracts range upward from 40 percent.   The small amount 
of overhead allowed by IDRC probably covered only the marginal costs of the 
university administering the contract and left little over for the fixed costs of 
sustaining a university.  Prudent university administrators might look long and 
hard at any follow-up project that involves such modest overheads.  It may be 
unrealistic to expect universities essentially to subsidize an IDRC project that 
involves objectives that are somewhat removed from university goals.  These 
modest overheads might deflect university administrators from backstopping the 
project with support staff, providing extra office space, or buying supporting 
library documents.    IDRC’s concerns with developing research networks 




It may be useful to reevaluate IDRC’s policies on overheads before 
initiating any new projects on microfinance. 
 
Community Oriented Financial Intermediaries (COFIs) 
 
 The title of the project was much broader than the institutions studied by 
the project.  I interpret COFIs as including a large variety of informal forms of 
finance, village banking, at least some forms of lending done by non-
governmental organizations, plus financial cooperatives.   The project focused 
entirely on financial cooperatives.  I suggest that any follow-on project drop COFI 




It was unrealistic to expect two people in Laval University, one with 
substantial teaching responsibilities, to manage effectively a complicated project 
that was supposed to work in 5 countries, treat questions that included dealing 
with three languages, plan and organize seminars overseas, and co-ordinate with 
eight institutions (including IDRC and DID).  Consideration might be given in any 
future projects to reducing the scope of work and bulking up the administrative 
support, possibly including a full-time bi- or tri-lingual administrative assistant, 
plus secretarial assistance.  If the project is expected to work across several 
languages, it might also be useful to include project money for translations and 
editing.  It is not an efficient use of researchers’ time to handle the details of a 




Participants in the project might have benefited from surveying a broader 
range of literature than they apparently did.  Leaders of any new microfinance 
project ought to use electronic libraries and other information sources that are 
available.  The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), for example, 
maintains The Microfinance Gateway that provides access to large numbers of 
publications on the topic of microfinance.  A search of that Gateway showed 178 
publications on the topic of regulation and supervision and 82 on the topic of 
credit impact studies. Few of these publications were mentioned in COFI 
documents.  Leaders of any follow-up project(s) should early connect with other 
organizations and researchers who are working on similar topics: CGAP, GTZ, 
the World Council of Credit Unions, the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Canadian Co-operative 
Association. 
 
It likewise would have been useful if the project compiled more information 
on the r&s systems that exist in the three countries where COFI did fieldwork.  In 
the Philippines, at least, there has been a substantial amount of work done on 
the r&s of financial cooperatives the past few years.  It would have been useful if 
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the COFI project had referenced that work and indicated how COFI’s activities 
contributed to the broader effort.   
 
Unit of Analysis 
 
Much of the data collection by COFI used the household as the unit of 
analysis.   Additional information was assembled that concentrated on financial 
cooperatives.  Given the three key ideas that were used to introduce the project 
proposal I would have expected that the primary unit of analysis would have 
been the small and medium-sized enterprises that were supposed to provide 
income and employment for poor people, after these firms had received loans 
from financial cooperatives.9  This type of information would have allowed COFI 
researchers to analyze the relationships between borrowing by these firms and 




There are hints of the advocacy in the project.  Work on financial 
cooperatives can slip into advocacy for one particular model, such as the one 
practiced by Desjardins.  The COFI project was vulnerable to this since it 
included co-funding by the Desjardins group and involved researchers who were 
steeped in Desjardins’ philosophy.  The system of r&s in the Desjardin’s model is 
quite different from the models used in many other countries, including English 
speaking Canada.  My impression is that these other models were 
underemphasized in COFI’s efforts.  
 
There is much to admire about the Desjardins system and its 
achievements in French speaking Canada.  One might argue, nonetheless, that it 
grew out of unique circumstances that limit its exportability: it had strong roots in 
the Catholic Church, it sprouted because French speakers felt excluded from 
English dominated banks, it became a common bond organization, and it was 
early involved in solving all types of problems faced by parishioners.10  As a 
result, the movement evolved into a strong federation that provided a wide 
variety of services to dependent cooperatives with low capital requirements.  The 
movement, however, did not penetrate much into English speaking Canada 
where another financial cooperative model became popular.  
 
                                      
9 In the 1970s and 1980s Michigan State University, under the leadership of Carl Liedholm, 
analyzed small and medium sized enterprises in a number of low-income countries.  It may have 
been appropriate to include some of their methodology in COFI’s research. 
10 The limits of the exportability of the Desjardins model is illustrated by the first U.S. credit union 
formed in St. Mary’s Parish in New Hampshire in 1908.  It  was formed by a priest who worked 
with poor, French speaking Canadians who migrated to New Hampshire to work in the textile 
mills.  This cooperative later became the St. Mary’s Bank but now operates like most other credit 
unions in the United States.  Instead of following the Desjardins model, financial cooperatives in 
the U.S. later evolved into largely specialized financial institutions with much more independence 
than in the Desjardins system.  
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Desjardins advocates argue for locating the auditing function within 
federations and oppose external r&s, the U.S. and English-speaking Canadian 
model.  Dejardins advocates discount the conflict of interest involved in vesting 
promotion and r&s in the same entity.  Proponents of the U.S. system stress the 
importance of economies of specialization, while Desjardins supporters 
emphasize the synergies created by having a strong, centralized federation that 
provides a variety of services, some of which are non-financial.  Desjardins 
supporters argue that financial cooperatives are best disciplined by the threat of 
losing access to vital services from the Federation.  Critics of the Desjardin 
model argue that capital requirements should be much higher than they are. 
 
If a follow-up project on r&s is funded by IDRC it might be appropriate to 
include organizations or individuals who are supportive of financial cooperatives 
in English speaking Canada and who are willing to explore other models of r&s.  
The philosophy of the new project ought to be that the r&s problem is one that 
many people are trying to solve and that valuable lessons might be drawn from a 
variety of experiences.  The perceived objectivity of researchers is diminished if 





Location of Agency Problems 
 
 Most of the modeling and data gathering on the agency problem by COFI 
concentrated on managers of financial cooperatives.  Clearly, the differences 
between the interests of managers of cooperatives and the concerns of their 
members are important issues.  Future work on this topic might expand and 
consider the agency problems that exist between federations and their member 
cooperatives, and between an external r&s agency and the financial cooperatives 
they oversee.11  This might also include questions about who regulates the 
regulator.  In some cases this has been addressed by having someone from the 
central bank or from the superintendent of banks monitor the external regulator. 
  
Credit Impact Studies 
 
COFI spent a lot on impact studies.  I received complaints from several 
country participants about too much emphasis being placed on these studies.  
They were costly to do, too commonly reported positive results, and involved 
serious methodological problems.12  The costs stem from the need to collect and 
analyze primary information, often captured through lengthy interviews with 
                                      
11 A recent melt-down of an external r&s agency for financial cooperatives in Guatemala 
dramatically illustrates this agency problem. 
12 A window into recent work on credit impact can be seen in publications issued by the project  
Assessing The Impact of Microfinancial Services (AIMS), funded by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development. 
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individuals, firm managers, or families.  Attribution difficulties and selection bias 
are the dominant methodological problems in credit-impact studies.  If the 
research design involves measuring changes over time in a group of 
“beneficiaries” of donor assistance, it is problematic to isolate and properly 
attribute the effect of the aid treatment (loans) on the selected change from other 
concurrent negative and positive forces that affect poor people.  For example, 
farmers may receive loans from financial cooperatives over several years and 
also experience an increase in their incomes.  But, most of their increase in 
income might result from favorable weather over the time under study that 
boosted their yields and income.  Sorting out the contributions of loans and 
weather to increased income is difficult.  In addition, longitudinal studies are 
notoriously expense. 
 
The approach used to measure credit impact in the COFI project involved 
the other primary methodology.  This approach compares a group of individuals 
who receive loans, with a group that did not.  This method, unfortunately, is 
dogged by selection bias problems.  For example, one group might be composed 
of microentrepreneurs who have received loans from financial cooperatives.   
The economic results of a control group of non-borrowers are then compared 
with the results of those who received loans.  The problem with this approach is 
that by its very nature lending involves selection of individuals who are 
creditworthy.  One’s creditworthiness, in turn, is determined by experience, 
intelligence, success in previous business ventures, assets owned, and possibly 
education.  Only if the selection process is short-circuited, and loans are 
distributed randomly, is it possible to compose a control group that is like the 
group receiving loans.13  Results that show borrowers perform better than non-
borrowers may simply indicate that borrowers had more entrepreneurial talents to 
start with than did non-borrowers. 
 
 If a new project is funded on financial cooperatives, I suggest the 
researchers not be required to do credit-impact studies.  If it is politically 
important to show that financial cooperatives contribute to poverty alleviation, this 
might be done through profiling members of these cooperatives and documenting 
that many of them are of modest means, particularly the depositors. 
 
What Happened to the Big Three Questions? 
 
 Project results might have been better focused if research efforts had 
been more closely tied to answering the general questions raised in the 
introduction of the project proposal.  Two of the three questions asked are 
important. 
                                      
13 I’ve seen only one study that side-stepped the selection-bias problem.  This study was based 
on two groups of individuals, all of whom had been approved for loans.  Only one group, 
however, actually received loans while the other, the control group, did not.  The costs of 
screening all the borrowers and non-borrowers, and the obvious public relations problems limit 
the use of this approach in  measuring credit impact. 
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Most students of development would answer the first question about the 
usefulness of finance to poor people in the affirmative.   Hundreds of millions of 
poor people around the world create and extensively use various forms of 
informal finance, both loans and deposits, because they benefit from doing so.  
Likewise, millions of poor people voluntarily participate in a variety of other semi-
formal or formal forms of finance, and show with their continued actions that they 
realize more benefits than costs from their actions.   Researching this question 
appears to substantiate the obvious. 
 
  The second question receives less uniform answers from development 
specialists and merits research.  Proponents of financial cooperatives might 
argue that large numbers of people of modest means are members of these 
organizations, that they hold substantial amounts of their savings there, and that 
many of the members benefit from borrowing from cooperatives.  Proponents 
might also argue that financial cooperatives can be induced to lend more to 
targeted segments of the poor such as micro-entrepreneurs, women, and 
farmers.  Skeptics, in contrast, argue that few members of financial cooperatives 
are truly poor, and that previous government and donor attempts to nudge these 
organizations into providing financial services to the poorest class have usually 
failed.14
 
There is even less consensus on the third question.15  Across countries, 
the range in quality and quantity of regulation and supervision of financial 
cooperatives is substantial.  In some cases, these cooperatives operate with little 
or no supervision, aside from their boards of directors.  In other cases, a 
department of cooperatives has the legal responsibility to regulate and supervise 
member organizations, but often lacks the capacity or incentives to do so 
effectively.  In still other cases a federation attempts to regulate its member 
organizations despite the conflicts of interest that are typically involved.  In a few 
countries the central bank or the superintendent of banks is charged with the 
responsibility of regulating and supervising financial cooperatives, often doing so 
with little enthusiasm, and sometimes doing so through a surrogate.    
 
Students of regulation and supervision also disagree on what types of 
activities should be regulated (Vogel).  Should small cooperatives with few 
members and few voluntary deposits be forced to incur the additional costs of 
submitting to an external regulation and supervision regime?  Is there a need to 
monitor externally closed-bonded cooperatives?  Should regulation and 
supervision be concentrated on large open-bonded cooperatives that mobilize 
                                      
14 Some of this nudging was done during the 1970s by donors who attempted to induce financial 
cooperatives to lend more to farmers.  More recently, various donors have prodded financial 
cooperatives to lend more to women and operators of small businesses.   
15 The interest in regulation and supervision of COFIs is not only a north/south concern, but is 
also an east/west concern in Canada. 
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substantial amounts of voluntary deposits?  COFI research shed some light on 
these questions.  A follow-on project ought to provide even more answers. 
 
 
Gaps for Possible Future Research 
 
 Financial cooperatives are a vital segment of the microfinance industry, 
but they receive relatively little research attention, compared to other non-
governmental organizations.  Looking at the microfinance industry in total, three 
important interrelated research gaps exist: deposit mobilization, regulation and 
supervision, and developing standard bookkeeping procedures that facilitate 
better governance, regulation and supervision.  All of these gaps apply to 
financial cooperatives.  IDRC might consider funding up to three coordinated 
projects on these topics.  Deposit mobilization is the most direct link between 
IDRC’s objective of alleviating poverty and the proposed projects. 
 
Deposit Mobilization  
 
 As Vogel and others have pointed out, deposit mobilization is the forgotten 
half of microfinance.  Most microfinance conferences focus mainly on lending, a 
huge majority of non-governmental agencies that do lending do not accept 
voluntary deposits, and many poor people, especially in rural areas, have 
extremely limited deposit opportunities.   A few research studies and a handful of 
development efforts, nonetheless, strongly suggest that many poor people can 
and will augment deposits if they have the opportunity and incentives to do so. 
 Financial cooperatives have the potential to fill an important portion of the 
deposit-taking gap that exists in many low-income countries, thereby benefiting 
more people of modest means.  Two factors support Canadians taking the lead 
in deposit mobilization.  First, Canadians have a vast amount of experience in 
developing highly successful financial cooperatives under two models.  Second, 
unlike large lending programs, deposit mobilization efforts require small amounts 
of external funding, a feature that fits with Canada’s limited resources for 
development efforts.  To the extent that IDRC’s projects must link to poverty 
alleviation, providing poor people access to attractive and safe deposit services 
could be the rationale for a new project that focuses on deposit mobilization. 
 
 A new project on this topic might include a careful review of literature, 
case studies of programs that successfully mobilized deposits, and an analysis of 
factors that discourage these activities.  It might also be helpful to study the types 
of savings services provided by informal finance, especially self-help financial 
groups (for example: tontines, chit funds, susus, stokvels, and tandas).  In a 
number of countries these informal organizations are major competitors of 
financial cooperatives, especially for deposits.  Understanding the advantages 
and types of services provided by these groups may assist financial cooperatives 
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to offer more attractive deposit products and services.16  Additional studies might 
be done on the costs of mobilizing deposits and managing them. 
 
Regulation and Supervision 
 
 Deposits are the primary justification for regulation and supervision, 
especially the deposits of poor people.  It is immoral to encourage poor 
individuals to place their deposits in organizations that are not properly governed, 
regulated, and supervised.  In most countries r&s problems in financial 
cooperatives are unresolved.  On the one hand, financial cooperatives can play 
an important role in mobilizing deposits.  On the other hand, as the COFI project 
documented, these cooperatives have several features that require heightened 
concerns about regulation and supervision when they handle large amounts of 
deposits.   
 
Due to the ambiguities in ownership arrangements cooperative leaders 
may not always act in ways that are in the best interest of all members -- the 
agency problem.  Also, when cooperatives have a federation, and regulation and 
supervision is vested in the federation, conflicts of interest may arise when the 
federation acts as both a promoter and a regulator.  Federation leaders may also 
be susceptible to the agency problem.  In addition, financial cooperatives have a 
proclivity to become dominated by borrowers at the expense of shareholders and 
depositors. 
 
 The status and effectiveness of regulation and supervision across low-
income countries varies substantially.  It is unlikely, therefore, that a single r&s 
prescription can be successfully applied everywhere.  Further research on this 
topic might include a review of the state-of-the arts in r&s.   How many countries 
have mixed r&s systems?  How many countries vested most r&s in a federation?  
How many countries require at least some financial cooperatives to submit to r&s 
by a banking authority?  How many countries effectively have no r&s system for 
their financial cooperatives?  Research might also include case studies of r&s 
models that work well, systems that have improved effectiveness, systems that 
failed, and cases that are accidents waiting to happen.  What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of each of these models?  When is it important to stress r&s 
and when is it not worth the cost? 
 
 Research on this topic should provide recommendations on how to move 
forward and improve existing systems.  What are the best ways to diminish or 
control agency and conflict of interest problems?  How does one build political 
support in a country for the legal changes that may be necessary to allow the 
formation of a more effective r&s system?  
 
                                      
16 At least in Peru, some financial cooperatives have absorbed  techniques used by self-help 
financial groups, locally called tanamoshies or panderos. 
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 Numerous organizations are currently interested in the r&s of financial 
cooperatives.  This includes donors such as the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and the Asia Development Bank.  WOCCU, GTZ/Germany, 
the Canadian Co-operative Association, and a number of policy makers in low-
income countries are likewise wrestling with how to better regulate and supervise 
financial cooperatives in low-income countries.  At least one university in the U.S. 
– the IRIS center in the University of Maryland – works on governance and 
regulation issues.  This widespread interest creates the opportunity for a 
university to take the lead worldwide on the topic of r&s for financial cooperatives 
in terms of both research and policy dialogue.  That effort might be spearheaded 
by IDRC assistance. 
 
If IDRC funds another project on r&s it might be appropriate for 
researchers to seek supplemental funding from both DID and the Canadian Co-
operative Association.  This might result in researchers considering a range of 
r&s models.  Project researchers should also reach out to other individuals who 
have interest or experience in developing r&s systems for financial cooperatives.  
This might involve sponsoring conferences and workshops where individuals with 
diverse experiences in r&s can share ideas and suggest research topics.  As 
interest expands in the topic, it might be appropriate to design an intensive, 





 Efficient and effective r&s is built on information.  It is difficult and 
expensive to evaluate the performance of financial cooperatives that do not have 
standard accounting systems.  One of the objectives of a new IRDC funded 
project might be to promote standard chart of accounts among financial 
cooperatives, with supporting rules of accounting.  This would lead to more 
transparency and comparability.  These accounts and rules are useful to 
strengthen governance of cooperatives and are vital for effective r&s.  Some of 
this research might be focused on cases where new information systems were 
successfully implemented and cases where the conversion was only partially 
successful. 
 
 Switching to a new, possibly more complicated, bookkeeping system is 
costly and usually forces boards of directors to change the way they evaluate the 
performance of their cooperatives.  For these reasons, managers and members 
of boards of directors often resist switching to a new bookkeeping system.  
Researchers might play a role in this by studying ways to encourage the 
conversion to more regulation-friendly bookkeeping systems.  In at least one 
case, in Honduras, cash grants were used to induce cooperative leaders to adopt 
and use new standard chart of accounts. 
                                      
17 This course might be modeled after the course on microfinance that Robert Christian runs in 





 Representatives of the two organizations that funded COFI, IDRC and 
DID, were generally satisfied with its results, but looked forward to further written 
output from the project.  IDRC was considering a follow-on project to COFI, 
suggesting they felt COFI was useful and opened doors for further promising 
research.  The three colleagues who headed research efforts overseas likewise 
were generally pleased with their participation in COFI. 
 
 My overall evaluation of the project is positive.   I concur that r&s of 
financial cooperatives is an extremely fertile area for research.  COFI made a 
valuable contribution to microfinance by calling more attention to this important 
topic.  Several important problems, however, limited the productivity of COFI.  
Trying to adapt the project to MIMAP’s grand design spread the original plans for 
the project too broadly over too many countries, and with a budget that was far 
too small to allow researchers to fulfill their original objectives.  Haggles over 
modest overhead rates and too little administrative infrastructure further 
hampered the project.  The project contributed most to understanding one aspect 
of the r&s problem, the agency issue in cooperatives.    
 
The primary weakness of the project was, in my opinion, that far too much 
time and effort was spent in collecting household information from borrowers and 
non-borrowers to document problematic credit impact.  This resulted in too little 
time and effort being expended on answering important questions raised in the 
original project proposal: do many poor people benefit from membership in 
financial cooperatives, do small businesses that borrow from cooperatives hire 
more employees, and what r&s structure would allow these cooperatives to 
perform better, especially regarding services for poor individuals?  
 
 Overall, IDRC appears to have gotten substantial value for the relatively 
small amount of money it invested in the important topic of r&s of cooperatives.   
I therefore suggest that IDRC consider three closely related microfinance topics 
for possible follow-on funding: deposit mobilization, a more focused project on 
r&s of financial cooperatives, and a project on stimulating adoption of standard 
chart of accounts in financial cooperatives.  This expanded commitment to 
microfinance might then justify IDRC/MIMAP adding staff with appropriate 
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